This article addresses key issues in performance, live, and time-sensitive art to lay the ground for new modalities of making sense of the artistic event. The work presented here is an assembly-or assemblage-of philosophical methodologies from the perspective of performance as creative/creating act and event. In terms of the approach being developed, performance becomes constitutive of the domain of sensing, intuiting, and imagining that which cannot be seen, grasped, or represented fully. A better explanation could be that performance as art, and unlike plastic and visual arts, consists of ephemeral, creative outputs (affects, vibrations, rhythms), which set the event apart from the 'ideal' object of the arts and humanities-the work of art. Thus, its content becomes invisible and un-textualisable through a purely aesthetic lens, in a way that other artistic phenomena are not.
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Within the framework of affect, the present investigation situates performance as a relationalrather than representational-event that places things, bodies, environments, rhythms, and sensations beside each other, in forms of both appearance and abstraction.
1 Emanating from such encounters are the immediate energies and recurrent vitalities that put 'things'-bodies-in relation with one another through a kind of intra-matter contact, or contagion. Affect studies, in their plurality, describe these abstracted elements and autonomous forces as seeping from and out of the very forms and expressions that distil them. They can be thought to belong to the bodything whilst existing detached from it. They are passed and returned, never the same. These traces inhabit the space of performance as a kind of sensuous technology that supersedes any mystifications of the text and fixations on the 'matter' of things.
With the faithful blindness of a critical method that seeks to reintegrate these incorporeal, invisible, and inconspicuous forces within worldly actuality, I here focus on the conception of performance as an 'alive' event that escapes and exceeds so-called common (and commonly human) sense. It does so by stirring the sensuous and synaesthetic capacities of bodies as they oscillate between the poles of animate and inanimate, apparent and invisible, inconsistent and emergent, extinguishable yet performable. These formulations aim to reconnect the paradoxes and tensions in the work of affective transmission with some deep questions around politics, aesthetics, and ethics. This model of affective contagion, I argue, can bring forth crucial shifts and changes in the contemporary understandings of natural, cultural, and performance events, where human and non-human bodies and subjectivities re-appear not as wholesome, finite entities, but as capacious and infectious realities always already expanded and extendable.
Hence, in what is to come, I will work at the intersection of the perceptive and the affective to articulate a syn-aesthetic-political philosophy of the event-performance. Intersecting the writings of Brian Massumi and Peggy Phelan, with a host of other contributors, I will be asking what is left of an embodied and creative event that moves toward its end without being (fully) exhausted.
Tracing its intrinsic and extrinsic modes of vitality-or aliveness-and virtuality-or affect-I will seek to reveal how its exemplary processual forms of emergence and dissolution project an ontogenetic, rather than ontological force. Against the illusion of permanence, against the ecstasy of here-and-now, against the liquidation of time and the walling of space, these ideas cultivate a sense of performance re-emerging at the liminal points of interaction, in the grey areas of sound exchange, in the secreted atmospheres of the sensuous, in the fluidity of movement and the density of attunement. In this misty climate, I hope, the reader shall find the premise (promise?) of things yet to come in the study of performance.
Performance-After the Vanishing
As an experiential framework and artistic strategy performance has historically drawn much of its energy and intensity from the 1960s and 70s tendencies to dissolve the materiality of the art object and expose the 'not-seen' in the frame of a creative and creating event-or "happening." 2 Catching this page of history one could feel its heat, and for a moment grasp the fragments-the PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 3 (1) (2017) mo(ve)ments 3 -of a strange kind of negative impulse igniting sensibilities, until, as the fervour dissipated in the following decades, it burnt to ciphers in the hands of chaotic post-(modern)isms.
But it is through the dense atmosphere of these dissenting movements and transmissions that I seek to articulate a conceptual framework and a critical methodology to relay the empirical history of an event that critically dissolves under the conditions of its exposure. This form of appearance is the result of the sensible encounter between the contingencies of the situation and the corporeal registers-or archives-that recognise and activate the rhythms, temporalities, dispositions, and singularities of its defining mo(ve)ments. These archives are as errant and slippery as the forces that generate them-affects-as they can hardly be grasped or observed.
In fact, the event of performance can be said to enact the crisis of representing something fleeting and phantasmatic that persistently proliferates outside of its frame (I will return to these arguments later in this section). As an aesthetic project, it foregrounds the work of the (un)conscious on real and imaginary times and spaces, curating a sustained on-goingness that unfolds an affective experience in presence, and as present: in the 'here and now.' But also, it works on the present as ahistorical anachronism, communicating the you-are-thereness of any then present now already-past moment that Rebecca Schneider (2011) calls "fugitive." Fugitive time regains the charge of past moments on the run in the present. These leaky, syncopated, errant moments playing in the crossfire of time can make things feel "a little uncanny, or dislocated, or unsettling, or queer" (180). 4 It is these feelings, I suggest, that constitute the un-resting force of performance and the potential to generate alternatives to its ontological versions.
Performance, therefore, can become an exemplary laboratory for sensing, recognising and registering its present and passing mo(ve)ments as consistently dissolving recurring actualities.
However, the question here emerges of how to attend to, and account for, the ever-vanishing reality of the being of/in this 'particular' event. Brian Massumi's notion of the event as a "supplementarity" 5 -an excess rupturing linear notions of space and time-provides a key for tuning in to the dispersed yet incipient ontology registered here:
The event is superempirical: it is the crystallization, out the far side of quasi corporeality, of already actualized spatial perspectives and emplacements into a time-form from which the passing present is excluded and which, for that very reason, is as future as it is past, looping directly from one to the other. It is the immediate proximity of before and after. It is nonlinear, moving in two directions at once: out from the actual (as past) into the actual (as future). The actuality it leaves as past is the same actuality to which it no sooner comes as future: from being to becoming. (Massumi 2002, 58) I would like to emphasise the elements of likeness between this definition and the assumed directions of the event-the happening-that performance actualises. Translating Massumi's notion to the context of performance might yield something like: the event's being is itself 'becoming' through the vanishing of the present into the past and/as the future. Now, let me replay these equations through a more familiar refrain: "[p]erformance's being becomes itself through PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 3 (1) (2017) disappearance" (Phelan 1993, 146) . And finally, allow me to rephrase it differently: the being of performance is itself a becoming-otherwise through the disappearance of its present presence into past and future actualities. To be sure, all these rhetoric articulations differ from each another, but they are nevertheless a semblance of one another in immediate, relational proximity. I will now attempt to reactivate their 'semblematic' value by turning to Massumi's later work, in Semblance and Event, in the attempt to requalify the affective ways in which disappearance becomes something other(wise) than itself within the event of performance.
Massumi speaks of the event as something passing, its potential (for change) only fully defined at its culmination: "[a]n experience determinately knows what it's been only as it peaks-which is also the instant of its 'perishing'" (2011, 9 Some twenty years before, Peggy Phelan wrote: "[w]ithout a copy, live performance plunges into visibility-in a maniacally charged present-and disappears into memory, in the realm of invisibility where it eludes regulation and control" (1993, 148) . The event-performance here emerges as the visible of what cannot be seen, of something that does not appear (visually) but rather that recedes into embodied techniques and fugitive forms of indiscernibility. Phelan's intent was to propose the move between matters of visibility and invisibility as the possibility to "value the immaterial", of becoming "unmarked", through an "active vanishing" that "refus [es] […] the pay-off of visibility" (6).
In a conversation with Marquard Smith ten years later, she reprises her earlier, and since much debated, motif:
I was trying to delineate a possible ethics of the invisible […] . I wanted to talk about the failure to see oneself fully. This failure is optical, psychoanalytical, and ethical.
[…] I was suggesting that this central failure, instead of being constantly repressed by culture, might be something we could acknowledge and even embrace. If this were possible, I thought perhaps a different ethics, a richer encounter between self and other might become actual and actual-izable. (Phelan 2003, 296 Clinical studies treat synaesthesia as a rare and pathological condition to which only certain subjects are prone. Yet, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) makes a case for the intertwining and blending of sensory modality to be inherent in the primordial, preconceptual lived experience of the world, he affirms:
Synaesthetic perception is the rule, and we are unaware of it only because scientific knowledge shifts the center of gravity of experience, so that we have unlearned how to see, hear, and generally speaking, feel, in order to deduce, from our bodily organization and the world as the physicist conceives it, what we are to see, hear, and feel. (229, original emphasis)
Synaesthesia is unusual only to the extent that the body has become estranged from direct experience and contact with the sensible, and entrenched in the objective (Cartesian) perspective of the world. Yet the biogram of the senses that overlap and blend is both an abstract and concrete way of being: not a tropological figure nor a cultural, historical, or artistic trend, not even a psychophysiological dysfunction, but indeed an actual perceptual mode (or more precisely, an amodal perception) that generally recedes to the background of ocularcentrism (and logocentrism). These disorienting experiences of corporeality 'hinge' on the lived practice of an abstraction-an affectivity 11 -that situates the relationality of the event in the indiscernibility of sensory dimensions that allow embodiment to fold back on itself all the potential variations in itself (see Massumi 2002, 194) .
There is here a co-functioning of the event and memory, Massumi explains:
remembering is a perceptual event. It is a reactivation of a biogram for purposes of reaccess. If an event-perception is faced, then when a biogram is reaccessed isn't the synesthete facing a previous facing?" (Massumi, 2002, 193) . In response, I feel the biogram taking shape as the synaesthetic 'spacing' of affectivity that situates a 'temporally' re-mediated performance at the intuitive centre between the relationality of being in the event and the movement of continuous re-sur-facing. At this crux, we keep "looking forward to our own past and looking past into the future, in a seeing so intense that it falls out of sight" (194, original emphasis). Ultimately, "synaesthetic perception is always an event or performance" (190) .
In (and out of) view of Phelan's riff of performance plunging into visibility as it dissolves into memory, and in the gamut of Massumi's synaesthetic reassembling of resurfacing events, I want to return (to) performance as a cross-modal perceptual field where sensory modes always come 132 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 3 (1) (2017) into and out of each other, interacting through processes of affective genesis. Hence, the eventperformance reappears as an ontogenetic, 12 rather than ontological, state of becoming through movement, intuition, transduction, composition, improvisation. It reoccurs as a form of distributed perspectives that considers complex, multimodal realities, that enacts the dislocation of space and time, and that reflects the interaction of unrelated elements. This creative process is accessible to anyone with access to affectivity, at any time, and again, through the gap of sensation.
The The result is an open system that, like an "organism on the run" (Castellucci et al. 2007, 39) , transmutes and transmigrates within itself with every changing season and shifting geography. In performance terms, this production spawned a cycle of eleven interconnected but discrete episodes in ten different European cities over three years. Likewise, actions, sounds, props, and other elements evolve and mutate as they are replicated and remodulated in different episodes.
However, the graphic emblem, and one of the aesthetically consistent motifs of the cycle, is the (re)occurrence of "anonymous" acts of violence (see Castelluci et al. 2007, 14) . All eleven episodes explicitly show signs of this 'tragic' impetus: in Brussels, a young police officer is beaten to a bloody pulp by his colleagues; in Paris, Carravaggio's Sacrifice of Isaac is recreated over two washing machines; in London, a man cuts off his tongue and feeds it to a cat; in Marseille, a naked woman is exhibited, abused, and photographed in front of a group of gentlemen spectators; in Cesena, a PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 3 (1) (2017) motored machine feeds arrows into a mechanical bow which slams them with full force into the opposite wall; and on and on.
The arresting power of these events has an aesthetic function but also operates as a fissure in representation. At stake here are strategies that reveal both the abstraction and the material force that spills out of scenes where affects and images continually clash. These practices imaginatively and pragmatically switch the register of violence as a force emerging from the realm of the virtual.
As Thomas Crombez affirms in his examination of cruelty in Socìetas Raffaello Sanzio's work:
'pure' violence or 'naked' force is never visible to the human eye. Whenever we watch an act of violence, be it real or imagined, we are being subjected to powerful perceptive and conceptual mechanisms in order to be able to frame this event.
[ itself-extracts and transforms the forms, the colours, the rhythms, the volumes, the sensations into the experience of a real abstraction. That is, the apparatus at work reveals images, actions, and situations as products of finely tuned incidents of perception. For example, and with the help of Wouter Hillaert's first-hand account, in the scene of the savage beating previously described:
Everybody could see that the torture was fake all the way. The blood had been poured out before the action took place and the police batons were made of soft rubber. And still, this scene was quite horrible to watch. Especially because of the amplified sound of every beat on the victim's naked flesh, because of his spastic moves and his total silence afterwards. (Hillaert and Crombez 2005, 1) Hence, the force-full effect of violence becomes isolated from habitual frames of perception. The making and witnessing of this action is enveloped by sound, vision, movement, and the lack thereof, creating an experience in which one sense does not override the other, but rather in which the senses and their organs split and reform, like the living organisms of the title. In suspenseful split seconds between expression and apprehension, this encounter pierces the membrane of representation only to demonstrate that the shield is always already broken. Such instances elicit a biogrammatic-or inorganic 13 -sense of sonority, 14 aurality, tonality, visuality, and even 'hapticity': each subtly unhinged from their organic system, and the system of representation; no sooner slipping out then to seek ingress and participation elsewhere.
These instances are enacted and replicated on the stage-world, and on different world-stages; they double and triple, and multiply as by mitosis. This world of affects, this universe of forces, passes beyond everything we can identify; it becomes actualised without the vision-or spectacles-of PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 3 (1) (2017) subjectivity, revealing instead 'other sides' to ourselves. Such eccentric position involves a kind of moving beyond the human; a kind of overcoming of the (molar) self that propels experience into a (molecular) world of becomings. 15 In this sense, the mechanisms of affective forces are not the consequence of the material structures and actions onstage. Conversely, it is the expropriated, extricated, and exposed-the excarnate-system of affects that brings the latter into representation. The aesthetic, precisely, is activated by these invisible universes-the synaesthetic.
What is at stake in Tragedia Endogonidia is not a negative aesthetics of cruelty but an affirmative actualisation of virtual forces. These capacitated forms of (human and inhuman) life are the genuinely ontogenetic reincarnations-the being-becomings-of this performance work. Within the folds of situations at the limits of signification and interpretation, these creative acts demand us not to contemplate images but to harness sensations. Thus, the tragedy of violence here is less involved in the drive towards death, but indeed is absorbed in actualising the possibilities of life in transformation. Hence, the necessary passing of any present of the experience becomes irrevocably imbricated and inseparable from any past or future; a mutated incarnation of becoming anew.
These notions of affective mutations engender a form of inquiry that travels across myriad temporalities, reaccessing and reassessing the social, relational space fostered through the practice of alive performance. With these premises in mind, I now want to engage performance as a technique of affective modulation and sensory remediation. The creative processes it instigates can push beyond the scaffolding of the subjective/objective divide to embrace the production of singularities through PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 3 (1) (2017) A spatial metaphor for a temporal phenomenon, it is a shadow cast in front of an object; the temporal analog is an event that indicates (is the 'shadow' of) another event to come" (601). This shady figuration throws into evidence a predestined event where time becomes foreclosed:
When a storm foreshadows a catastrophe, the storm is there because the catastrophe follows; it is an effect of that future catastrophe visible in temporal advance much as the shadow of an object may be visible in spatial advance. Because the future is already there-is substantial enough to cause earlier events and to send signs backwards-foreshadowing ensures a temporality of inevitability. Sideshadowing conveys the sense of something more: the intensity and pressure of temporalities continually competing for actuality. In this figuration, the present 'here and now' splits to the sides of unrealised past potentials and realisable future occasions. The consequences for time are concrete:
[i]n sideshadowing […] the actual and the possible, are made simultaneously visible. This is not a simultaneity in time but of times; we do not see contradictory actualities, but one possibility that was actualized and another that could have been but was not. Time itself acquires a double and, often, many doubles. A haze of possibilities surrounds each actuality. (602, original emphasis) PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 3 (1) (2017) Hence, whereas the foreshadowing reveals the figure of an impending (no)future, sideshadowing conjures the weather, the atmosphere of actual events that might indeed have happened differently, that are 'present' as other possibilities, or that are yet to be/come possible alternatives.
These time shadows gain significance in the narrative of performance in the way their emergence can make its temporalities (be)come open and loose in the space of experience. By letting these registers exist 'together' and 'beside' each other, I intend to propose an ecstatic model of reaccessing, relaying, and relating the event whose "foreshadowings" convey a sense of the ongoing experience of being alive in the cut opened by sensory experience, and whose "sideshadowing" cast its possibilities beside themselves, dragging it toward and away from its end, and beyond our foresight or foreshadow of it. These com-possibilities are invested with affects expressed as the virtual, ghostly co-presence of potentials emerging from a suspenseful gap. Each episode presented a mutated incarnation of the same constellation of images and ideas, becoming itself anew in relation to each host city.
[…] As director Romeo Castellucci describes the cycle's process: "It is not a finished show that is moved from city to city. Its moving around is the show; a rhythm that strikes; a transformed organism, like the different phases in the life of an animal or vegetable" […] . In other words, this is a theatre that attends to the "passing moment" not so much in terms of its loss or disappearance, but as an organism's move elsewhere, a step aside or a perversion; the performance becomes other than itself. (2009, 147, my emphasis) This process, according to Sack, permeates the further transmutations of these performative structures into textual, video, and sound media. These living remains proliferate like spores, outgrowing the system that originated them. Distended and stretched, they spread across indiscrete temporal zones, all beside themselves-formal approaches, theoretical underpinnings, the experience of witnessing, the doubling of memory:
the video memory takes seriously the claims of philosophers of process, such as Henri Bergson and Alfred Whitehead, that temporality does not operate in a uniform and measurable manner but is entirely elastic and malleable. In the same PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 3 (1) (2017) move, the video transposes the cycle into the register of memory, into our own rearrangements of experience after the fact. (149) The ensuing actualities of the experience escape from re-presentation by creating new performances that play against the internal logic of the event. These ongoing transformations deliver a model for thinking of performance remains as happening both inside and outside, transformed beyond and beside the fixed structures (of capture) that yet exist. In the writing of Joe Kelleher and Nicholas Ridout: "The afterlife of the work […] is already to be built in, as it were, to the life of the work. But then to call it a life, and to conceive this life as a life that remains, is also to conceive a mutation, beyond the will or craft of the maker" (Castellucci et al. 2007, 6) .
Tragedia Endogonidia originates a process that is processual and divergent in its forms of affective expressions. But also, it creates an 'ecology' of occurrences coming-together and beside one another. Moving across thresholds and propelling their force into and out of different vibrationsvirtualisations-they make apparent both their coming into being and the imminent compossibilities of existing otherwise. These knotted events enact both the realisation of the possible, that is the "foreshadows" that always already resemble incarnate reality, and the actualisation of the com-possibilities of the event; the "sideshadows" of its excarnate potentials.
These multiple and simultaneous directionalities, I suggest, are expressed in performance as the technological and synaesthetic site of a reemergent and remodulated dispersal. Its pragmatic, generative strategies attend to the purposive disposition of elements constituted relationally, collectively and transductively-objects, people, environs, rhythms, sensations-in (col)lateral spread. It occurs as a particular and singular operational ecology of relational happenings. Thus, this event of contact and transformation decenters the human subject into a broader distribution that breaks the linearity of object/subject relations. Lastly, as a sphere of interaction (at least partly) distinct and separate from human activity and ordinary life at large, it presents a recognisable setup for unpredictable and unimagined collaborations between different forms of life.
The result is an affective economy grounded in the processes of adaptation and disarticulation of the virtual mo(ve)ments connecting more-and less-than-human entities, exposing to view the inhuman aspect of the historical and material dimension of processual meaning and relational becoming. This very empirical experience arises in the 'present' of an existent world; that is, in the 'socialised' scene of historically, culturally, and politically embodied matter calling for the emergence of an abstract-virtual spatiotemporal sphere of the 'sensible'-and ethical-that can only be conceived as a non-consecutive re-enactment. In other words, experiencing visually and comprehending conceptually that which is visually imperceptible and conceptually incomprehensible constitutes the eventfulness of performance as an immanent force of becominghuman, becoming-otherwise, becoming-political; a moment of ontological unbinding that can disrupt, disarticulate, and deface the 'present' state of the body politic.
Hence, I reiterate the practice of performance to be a technology that redistributes the aliveness of relationality and contingency in the production of an synaesthetic event of being becoming-of perpetual happening. Its intensive duration casts aside whirling sensations, affects, and PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 3 (1) (2017) mo(ve)ments as swarming spatial and temporal fragments-or sideshadows. This abstracted potential somehow just remains off to the side, as a perpetual remainder, as a not-yet-exhausted excess, a third or a fourth body; a more-to-come preempting what is yet to become. These recursive virtual counterpoints make things literally and metaphorically 'beside themselves' with the presence of their exteriorised potential.
In the introductory remarks to Touching Feeling (2003), Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick advances the concept of the "beside." "Beside," she writes, "permits a spacious agnosticism about several of the linear logics that enforce dualistic thinking: noncontradiction or the law of the excluded middle, cause versus effect, subject versus object" (8, original emphasis). Beside (not beneath, behind, or beyond) is a spatial determinant that eschews the flat line of opposition and duality. Taking a "distinct step to the side" of any constitutive project of subjectivity invokes a logic that suggests multiple (Deleuzian) assemblages, wherein any "number of elements" may lie and operate "alongside one another" (6). Moving in this trajectory, I will next expand on the creative life forms of performance, human or otherwise than human, that share a spatiotemporal co-presence, which is also a spatiotemporal co-difference in which they exist all 'beside themselves'.
In what follows, I recognise how similar affective movements and potentials find their 'ends', without finalisation, in particular bodily experiences that surge within the frame of artistic, critical and aesthetic events that I here gather under the loose and slippery term performance. I argue that this technology of synaesthetic 'spacing' and 'timing' of affectivity situates a remediated encounter that places its intuitive fulcrum in the relationality of its eventfulness-in the mo(ve)ments of feelingwith the others, the many others, beside the self.
Catchy Feelings
In performance, the passage from event to experience, from experience to knowledge, and back, occurs in the affective co-presence (and co-attendance) of being beside-our-selves, despite and because of our singularities. In this context, Brian Massumi's notion of "affective attunement," or Crucially, processual forms of being-with-others are always at play in the relational milieu of performance in the conscious and unconscious ways in which individuals differently partake in the event, and by the forms through which typical and non-habitual responses emerge and are transmitted and caught.
I want to draw an analogy here between these ideas and philosopher Teresa Brennan's theories on affective transmission. Brennan (2004) similarly relays affect as an ever-present circuit of life energies that travel between people through a "process that is social in origin but biological and physical in effect", which she calls "entrainment" (3). Brennan mobilises this term from biochemistry and neurology to articulate the process "whereby one person's or one group's PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 3 (1) (2017) nervous and hormonal systems are brought into alignment with another's" (9). The philosopher brings together evidence on molecular flux, body language, and shared rhythms in order to trace the transmissions between bodies-understood in a broad sense-through the ways they "feel the atmosphere" or pick up on the "mood" in the room. This affective climate is not simply 'caught' or transmitted between subjects; rather, "[t]he 'atmosphere' or the environment literally gets into the individual" (1).
Brennan's work pays close attention to both biological and cultural factors that contribute to such disseminations; however, she emphasises that affect is a "profoundly social thing" (68). She carefully maps the power relationships that subtend energetic exchanges through which certain rhythms are subsumed by some-body, or blocked by others. Since affects evoke thoughts, individuals may become emotionally "entrained", or attuned, even though the particular meanings one attaches to those affects will vary: "[t]he point is that even if I am picking upon your affect, the linguistic and visual content, meaning the thoughts I attach to that affect, remain my own: they remain the product of the particular historical conjunction of words and experiences I represent"
.
Hence, affect is impersonal (and transpersonal) in infection, but personal in situated, individual effect-that is, in the movement to emotion, thought, and action. The transmission and escalation of energetic blueprints depends on a shared focus of "living attention" sensible to physical proximity, distance, or contact. Brennan likens bodies to transducers or conversion channels: far from being self-contained, they are porous and permeable; they are affected and affecting:
"understanding the influences to which we are subject in terms of passions and emotions, as well as living attention, means lifting off the burden of the ego's belief that it is self-contained in terms of the affects it experiences" (95). In the choreography of the I-Other relation, and in the concrete, experiential forms of non-conscious and proprioceptive transfers that take place through touch, smell, sight, movement, sound, taste occurring directly between bodies, the sensed tacit knowledge I'm talking about […] the technical staging of aesthetic events that speculate on life, emanating a lived quality that might resonate elsewhere, to unpredictable affect and effect. Stagings that might lend themselves to analogical encounter and contagion. That might get involved in inventive accidents of history. I'm talking about architectures of the social and political unforeseen that enact a relation of nonrelation with an absolute outside, in a way that is carefully, technically limited and unbounded. (Massumi 2011, 80 ) PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 3 (1) (2017)
Through mimesis or a 'contagion' of sorts, the techné of performance can express a sensuous rather than representational-an ontogenetic rather than ontological-activity by producing a reality in excess of its materiality. These accidents of histories, or sideshadows, conceive and generate responses; new perceptual events that echo the potential to affect the social and the political body. This, dare I say, is the alive-not the same as 'live'-condition of performance: not the "immediate" and "transitory present moment" (see Auslander 1999) , not the 'here and now' of being 'there and then', not the image without a cut, not the record without a trace, not the memory without the flesh. But say, the brooding sense of a practice of living attention (living-a-tension), the durational intensity of the fore-echo of a return (see Massumi 2011, 113) , the ungrasped pulse of a past yet to come, the hiccup of a sound reaching up to the cusp of silence; the ecstasy of feeling always "more-than-one", 17 except, once again, not-one time, not even-space, already suspendedpure "aliveness" (see Massumi 2011, 146) .
Out of this suspenseful state emerges an impulse to move toward recognizing an infectious quality, some perilous potency, or just an un-common feeling-that, arising from sensible disarticulations, begs for cultural, social, and political attention. Approaching these concepts from what feels to be their 'side effects', I will follow the metaphor of carnal contagion into the material(ist) impulse to move toward refiguring an syn-aesth-ethic politics of 'uncommon-sense'.
Uncommon Sense
The incipient and recursive practice of performance can make manifest the 'likeness' of a politics of imperceptible socialisation that has at its heart a revi(r)t(u)alisation-that is, a re-transmission of the affective force of the event away from territorialising pulls and apprehensive logics of arrest.
We might put these affective transmissions in relation to that potential described by Jacques Ranciére (2010) for an event to disrupt, disarticulate, and disfigure the 'present' state of affairs of a body politic with an 'uncommon' aesthetic sense of partaking, enabling seeing and knowing in ways that are yet unseen and unknown: "[f]or critical art is not so much a type of art that reveals the forms and contradictions of domination as it is an art that questions its own limits and powers, that refuses to anticipate its own effects" (149).
Ranciére refers to this agonistic process of art as dissensus, the relation-of-nonrelation that is experienced in-between the artwork's dynamic form and its re-presentation. This disjunctive quality, I suggest, constitutes the making of a semblematic event whose substance is involved in nonsensual and dissensual ways of 'being-with', in relational co-presence-with intimate others and extimate selves-without coalescence. This 'unassuming' relationality can disarticulate the power of stringent forms and aggregational norms via a synaesthetic politics of aliveness that sets off the self-differing and self-perpetuating momentum of unforeseen potential. This dissonant charge, I argue, becomes expressed in the event-performance through the affective resonance of its dynamic entanglements; that is, the concrete relational and situational configuration of feelingwith and beside others, in dissensual ways. PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 3 (1) (2017) Make a vanishing point appear, where the interaction turns back in on its own potential, and where that potential appears for itself. That could be a definition of producing an aesthetic effect" (2011, 49, original emphasis). The occurrent artist might offer a sonic reply: "Ring the bells that still can ring / Forget your perfect offering / There is a crack, a crack in everything / That's how the light gets in / That's how the light gets in / That's how the light gets in" (Cohen 1992 ).
An affective performance philosophy might conceptualise and mobilise the 'aesthetic affect' of a creative blind spot in and around the research and practice of performance. It would seek to return, again and again, to what might appear as the least hospitable place, but one that might offer the most critical and vital access route to the inventive charge of the event: the middle of the cut-the crack, the opening-as a fathomless aperture governed by a radically different logic than that of the representational norm of visibility-ocular-centrism. Cracks abound on the maps of existence, in the exploration of space and the reconstruction of time. Pursuing the incipient gaps in knowledge and experience in the folds of the aesthetic, I approach the event-performance as an actual and abstract device for thinking about, generating and re-imagining relational and ethical practices. Unlike the direct images we obtain from more obvious vantage points, breaks and holes offer an inflected sense of something unanticipated, something that broods from under the grounds of our cognition, eliciting further attention.
These zones of divarication and deformation are generative of variations that extract from the realm of the aesthetic the very abstraction that allows the cut to be open, elastic and resonant across practices and modalities of perceiving, and perceiving differently. From this sundering of experience a making sense of events emerges as the residual force of the semblance, whose unpredictable appearance disrupts, challenges, and resists attempts at representational capture; that is, it 'appears' in the suspension of all preconceived logics of (explicit) representation. This residue potential is what Roland Barthes ([1979] 1981) called the punctum: "the punctum is the appearance through the photo of an affective after-life. It is the strike of a life as a force, beyond PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 3 (1) (2017) an actual life. In other words, as abstracted from it, as a real but abstract force of life-likeness" (Massumi 2011, 57) .
The (biogrammatic) topography of performance, I propose, actualises the likeness of the striking force that cuts across the unique figure of an event of sensations where/when it wells on the cusp of its perishing. I have drawn attention here to this diagrammatic emblem as the indiscrete, indefinite singularity that relates to the apparent monadicity of the line between the virtual and the actual. The deep cuts and interruptions within this inorganic experience connects in affective ways to the folding and unfolding of "bare life" 18 -the incipient traces of embodied difference. This figurative element is the differenciator-the "dark precursor," to say it with Deleuze (1993, 119)-which makes 'different' more apparent, the space between dissimilars that connects them through their difference. Its inherent abstraction-virtuality-is here posed as the semblematic value within the operative systems of artistic performance as the invisible, affective force that puts bodies into immediate relation to one another. It is, in other words, the visceral, suspenseful act that designates nothing less than a lure for thinking-and feeling-with others.
This diagrammatic configuration becomes fleshed out beside any phenomenological or psychoanalytical, embodied or immersive, wholly specular body experience. Specifically, what takes place in the gap of the disappearance of the imagistic body of the self-possessed subject is the range of relative perspectives in which the body is subject, object, and in-between; its emergent qualities interlocking, distributed, contingent, and multiple. What is left is a continuous process transposed on a temporal scale of interstitial nodes where empirical space is distantiated and the relational engendered by the distribution of affective architectures and topographies. This is a manifestation of the virtual: it belongs to the virtual. It is real but also abstract, with a potentiality of mediations and transformations that actualises the event-full process of being-becoming, becoming-intense, becoming-other, and now, becoming-with-others. I have called this alive performance.
In this sense, performance indeed reappears as a sensuous experience of nonsensuous relations, as a form-or technique-of life fundamentally shared. Its affective currents arise spontaneously and often come to pass 'unrecognised', falling outside of consciousness. They are activated and disseminated; kinetically and synaesthetically yoked together across sensory, spatial, and temporal disparities. They operate through vision but are not contained in or by it. By manipulating rhythm, movement, scale, and light differentials, this practice of abstraction makes its subject appear and disappear with the mimesis and artifice necessary for the event to return its repeated invocations and re-orientations. It can produce a visual experience of essentially invisible realms: shared phantoms or shadows that "might be better off called a fictive relational reality" (Massumi 2003, 12) ; incorporeal interactions of separate forms of life that emerge together in occurrent affective attunement. From this perspective, alive performance can envelop a universe of felt relations and constitute a "tacit archive of shared and shareable experience" (Massumi 2003, 9) ; a register of semblances in which no-thing consistently reappears. An affective archive that is returned in the flesh-and-blood of things burning with, always with, the many others, in intensified contact. PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 3 (1) (2017)
What we experience in this archive is an intensity mobilised through proprioceptivity and viscerality; a folding in and out of subject-object relationality in a 'sensitive' time-form. The cellular structures of this inorganic semblance of bare life can be articulated as the critical practice of a vital and virtual archive of experience: the visceral sensibility of the temporalities of the flesh; all flesh, human and inhuman. These incorporeal registers are here activated as a temporality of habit and memory that recognises the excitations of life that reappear-remediated, remodulated, recirculated-across possible futures of opened-up pasts, hence remaking the historical present of performance as something lived, alive, still happening, and more. The pragmatic implication of such interpretive gestures is an syn/aesth/ethic theory of performance and research that traverses the alive bodies and matters with an immersive activist philosophy.
